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JURISDICTION
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(j) and pursuant to the summary judgment entered as a final judgment by the
trial court. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)G).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("Fireman's Fund") is dissatisfied with Appellant
Big Sky Finance Company's ("Big Sky") statement of issues on appeal. As such,
Fireman's Fund submits the following as a correct statement of the issues on appeal:
1.

Did the district court err in granting Fireman's Fund's uncontested

Motion for Summary Judgment and determining that the only claim Big Sky raised
against Fireman's Fund was one for fraudulent nondisclosure - a claim the district court
concluded was factually and legally without merit?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Big Sky's Motion

for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

An appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary

judgment for correctness, affording no special deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. See Girbich v. Numed Inc.. 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). The reviewing
court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court,
1

even if it is not relied on below. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah
1993).
2.

The decision to grant a party leave to amend is left to the sound

discretion of the district court. See e.g., Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev.,
Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 1998); Westlev v. Fanner's Ins. Exch.. 663 P.2d 93, 94
(Utah 1983). A district court's decision regarding leave to amend will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the complaining party. See Norman
v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, P38.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

In November 1997, Big Sky filed suit against Avis and Archibald Title
Insurance ("Avis and Archibald") for violating escrow instructions relating to a real estate
investment between Big Sky and an individual by the name of Wayne Ogden.
In April 2002, Big Sky filed an Amended Complaint seeking to recover
damages from Avis and Archibald's insurance companies, Lawyer's Title and Fireman's
Fund. Big Sky's Amended Complaint alleged that Fireman's Fund fraudulently failed to
disclose the existence of an insurance policy that it alleges would have provided liability
coverage for the claims Big Sky had asserted against Avis and Archibald. In response to
a motion for summary judgment filed by Lawyer's Title, Big Sky sought leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint to add additional causes of action. The trial court denied
Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend and granted Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary
2

Judgment.
Later, Fireman's Fund moved for summary judgment in its own right. Big Sky
made no effort whatsoever in opposing Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and on August 9, 2004, the trial court granted Fireman's Fund's Motion finding it to be
meritorious. Despite having filed no opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion, Big Sky
now appeals the trial court's ruling.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

Big Sky filed its original Complaint on November 17, 1997. (R. 001.) More
than four years later, on April 2, 2002, Big Sky filed an Amended Complaint, naming
Fireman's Fund as an additional defendant. (R. 174.) On June 11, 2004, Fireman's Fund
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 452.) After Big Sky made no effort to
oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion, on August 9, 2004, the trial court granted the same.
(R. 589.) On September 10, 2004, the trial court signed an order granting Fireman's
Fund's Motion. (R. 592.) On March 22, 2005, the trial court entered an order making its
September 10, 2004 Order on Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment final and
appealable under Rule 54(b). (R. 694.) On March 29, 2005, Big Sky filed a notice of
appeal regarding the trial court's March 22, 2005 Order. (R. 674.)
C.

DISPOSITION OF THE COURT.

The trial court granted Fireman's Fund's uncontested Motion for Summary
Judgment on August 9, 2004, dismissing Big Sky's claim as a matter of law. (R. 589.)

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are taken in large part from Defendant Fireman's Fund's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Big Sky failed to
oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion, these facts are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule
7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. The Big Sky Lawsuit
1.

On November 14, 1997, Big Sky filed suit against Avis and

Archibald Title Insurance Company, and its escrow agent, Jayson Cherry, for violating
escrow instructions concerning the disbursement of certain funds relating to a real estate
investment between Big Sky and an individual by the name of Wayne Ogden. Avis and
Archibald was represented by its private attorneys Nalder & Stratford during this time.
(See generally. R. 456-58; R. 459, f 19.)
2.

On February 13, 1998, Big Sky served a set of discovery requests on

Avis and Archibald seeking certain documents relevant to its claim. (R. 459, f 20.)
3.

On April 2, 1998, Avis and Archibald responded to Big Sky's

discovery requests by producing a copy of the policy and Declarations Sheet from Avis
and Archibald's Professional Liability Policy with Fireman's Fund as well as contact
information for Fireman's Fund. (R. 459-60, ^ 21.)
4.

On April 8, 1999, apparently not recognizing the production of the

same information a year beforehand, counsel for Big Sky again inquired as to the identity
of Avis and Archibald's insurance company. (R. 460, |22.)
4

5.

On April 12, 1999, counsel for Avis and Archibald again produced a

copy of the Fireman's Fund policy, Declarations Sheet and contact information, and
indicated that this information had been produced a year earlier. (R. 460, 123.)
6.

On April 26, 1999, Avis and Archibald informed Fireman's Fund for

the first time of the lawsuit filed by Big Sky. This letter was copied to Big Sky, and again
included the contact information and policy number for Avis and Archibald's policy with
Fireman's Fund. (R. 460, 124.)
7.

On June 10, 1999, Fireman's Fund (a/k/a Interstate) acknowledged

receipt of Avis and Archibald's April 26, 1999 notice of claim, indicating that it was the
first notice it had received of the Big Sky lawsuit. Fireman's Fund also indicated that
there were coverage issues that would have to be determined. (R. 460,125.)
8.

On January 16, 2002, the trial court granted a motion by Big Sky for

leave to file an amended complaint. (R. 461,127.) Big Sky's Amended Complaint added
Fireman's Fund as a defendant, claiming fraudulent non-disclosure of the existence of a
policy of insurance. Big Sky claimed that Fireman's Fund had somehow attempted to
conceal the fact that it had issued a professional liability policy to Avis and Archibald.
(R. 461,128.)
9.

Big Sky's Amended Complaint also added Lawyer's Title Insurance

Corporation ("Lawyer's Title") as a defendant, also claiming fraudulent non-disclosure of
the existence of a policy of insurance. (R. 181.)

5

II. Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment and Big
Sky's Motion to File Second Amended Complaint
10.

On July 22, 2003, Lawyer's Title moved for summary judgment,

arguing that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent nondisclosure failed as a matter of law. (R.
204.) In substance, Lawyer's Title argued that, while it had no duty to do so, the
undisputed evidence showed that Lawyer's Title had in fact disclosed all of the
information Big Sky requested regarding the existence of an insurance policy that had
been issued to Lawyer's Title. (R. 210-11.) Accordingly, Lawyer's Title argued there
was no basis for Big Sky's claim. (R. 211.)
11.

On July 31, 2003, Big Sky responded to Lawyer's Title's Motion

and made a cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 334.) In addition, on or about
September 18, 2003, now several years after Big Sky filed its original Complaint, Big Sky
moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (R. 313.)
12.

In its supporting memorandum, Big Sky argued that it needed to

amend its complaint and add specific causes of action to allege that Lawyers Title "is
liable for the acts of its agent [Avis and Archibald], as detailed in the Utah statutory law
and the general common law of agent/principal or respondeat superior." (R. 314.)
13.

Accompanying Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend was a copy of

Big Sky's (Proposed) Second Amended Complaint, which added an Eighth Cause of
Action. (R. 317.) Big Sky's Eighth Cause of Action purports to allege claims against
Lawyer's Title for statutory liability under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, vicarious
6

liability under respondeat superior, and against Fireman's Fund and Lawyer's Title for
insurer liability for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 325-26.)l
14.

Lawyer's Title filed a memorandum opposing Big Sky's motion to

amend, and Fireman's Fund formally joined in the same. (R. 384; R. 411, respectively.)
15.

After briefing was completed and oral argument heard, the trial court

ruled on the various motions. Among other things, the trial court determined that Big
Sky's Amended Complaint asserted a single cause of action for fraudulent nondisclosure.
(R. 573.) The trial court found that based on the undisputed facts, Big Sky's
nondisclosure claim against Lawyer's Title failed as a matter of law, and therefore,
Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. (R. 573-74.) The
trial court also determined that Big Sky's Motion to Amend should be denied based on
considerations of untimeliness, no justification for delay, and prejudice. (R. 575.)
III. Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment.
16.

On June 11, 2004, Fireman's Fund filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment. (R. 452.) Similar to Lawyer's Title, in its supporting memorandum,
Fireman's Fund argued that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent nondisclosure failed as a
matter of law. (R. 462.)

1

For reasons described later in this brief, it is important to note that the only claim
set forth in the Eighth Cause of Action that is directed at Fireman's Fund is for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
7

17.

Fireman's Fund explained that, while it had no duty to do so, it too

had previously provided Big Sky with a copy of the Fireman's Fund policy and, as such,
Big Sky's claim for fraudulent nondisclosure of the insurance policy lacked merit. (R.
465-66.)
18.

Fireman's Fund also argued that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent

nondisclosure should be dismissed based on the expiration of the three-year statute of
limitations Utah law imposes on any action for fraud. (R. 466-68.)
19.

Big Sky made absolutely no effort to oppose Fireman's Fund's

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 47.)
20.

In a decision dated August 9, 2004, the trial court noted that

Fireman's Fund's Motion was uncontested, but granted the same finding it to be
meritorious. (R. 589.)
21.

On September 10, 2004, the trial court signed an order granting

Fireman's Fund's Motion and making the following findings:
The Court finds that plaintiff Big Sky is unable to show that
Fireman's Fund owed it a duty to disclose under the undisputed
facts of this case as Big Sky shared no contractual, fiduciary or
confidential relationship with Fireman's Fund. In addition, the
Court finds that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent non-disclosure lacks
factual merit as a copy of Avis & Archibald's insurance policy with
Fireman's Fund was in fact disclosed to Big Sky no later than April
of 1998. Finally, the Court finds that Big Sky has failed to bring its
fraudulent non-disclosure claim within the applicable statute of
limitations.
(R. 593.)
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22.

On March 22, 2005, the trial court entered an order making its

September 10, 2004 Order on Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment and its
July 8, 2004 Order on Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment final and
appealable under Rule 54(b). (R. 694.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Big Sky has filed the instant appeal asking that this Court reverse the trial
court's ruling on Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment. Even though Big
Sky made no effort to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion at the trial court level, Big Sky
argues that the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
It has long been held in Utah that, as a general rule, appellate courts will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. By failing to oppose Fireman's Fund's
Motion for Summary Judgment, each issue raised by Big Sky respecting the trial court's
ruling on Fireman's Fund's Motion is an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
Because Big Sky has presented no reasonable justification for its failure to preserve issues
for appeal, Fireman's Fund should be dismissed from this appeal.
In addition, the facts of this case demonstrate that, even if Big Sky had
preserved issues for appeal, the trial court's decision granting Fireman's Fund's Motion
for Summary Judgment was correct in all respects. As a result, Fireman's Fund requests
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed.

9

ARGUMENT
I. BIG SKY DID NOT OPPOSE FIREMAN'S FUND'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THEREFORE
FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ISSUES FOR APPEAL.
Big Sky's appeal from the trial court's decision on Defendant Fireman's
Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment is fatally flawed and should be dismissed.
On June 11, 2004, Fireman's Fund moved for summary judgment. (R. 452.)
Big Sky's Amended Complaint alleged a single cause of action - fraudulent nondisclosure. Fireman's Fund moved for summary judgment on the basis that it owed no
duty to disclose to Big Sky, a third party claimant, the existence of the insurance policy.
(R. 463.) Furthermore, Big Sky's claim completely lacked merit as the undisputed facts
clearly showed that a copy of the insurance policy had been disclosed to Big Sky from the
outset of its litigation with the insured, Avis and Archibald. (R. 465.) In addition, Big
Sky's claim for fraudulent non-disclosure was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. (R. 466.)
Under Utah law, when a motion for summary judgment is made and properly
supported, the adverse party must respond in order to oppose the motion. See e.g.. Rule
56, Utah R. Civ. P. ("an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.") "Summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response."
See id.
10

In this case, Big Sky made absolutely no effort to oppose Fireman's Fund's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Big Sky filed no opposition memorandum, no affidavit,
no motion for a Rule 56(f) continuance, nothing. Fireman's Fund's Motion was
completely uncontested. On August 9, 2004, the trial court granted Fireman's Fund's
Motion, finding the uncontested motion to be meritorious. (R. 589.) On September 10,
2004, the trial court entered an order regarding Fireman's Fund's Motion, which stated, in
relevant part:
The Court finds that plaintiff Big Sky is unable to show that
Fireman's Fund owed it a duty to disclose under the undisputed
facts of this case as Big Sky shared no contractual, fiduciary or
confidential relationship with Fireman's Fund. In addition, the
Court finds that Big Sky's claim for fraudulent non-disclosure lacks
factual merit as a copy of Avis & Archibald's insurance policy with
Fireman's Fund was in fact disclosed to Big Sky no later than April
of 1998. Finally, the Court finds that Big Sky has failed to bring its
fraudulent non-disclosure claim within the applicable statute of
limitations.
(R. 593.) On March 22, 2005, the trial court entered an order making its September 10,
2004 Order on Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment final and appealable
under Rule 54(b). (R. 694.)
Despite having made absolutely no effort to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion
at the trial court level, Big Sky has filed the instant appeal asking that this Court reverse
the trial court's ruling. In so doing, Big Sky attempts to raise issues that have not been
preserved and that have been raised for the first time on appeal.
In Utah, it is well settled that appellate courts will not address issues raised for

11

the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. 2003 UT 23, PI9
(refusing to address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal.); Healthcare
Services Group v. Utah Department of Health, 2002 UT 5 (declining to reach the merits
of new arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004
UT 98, P43. The only recognized exceptions to this rule arise when "exceptional
circumstances" or plain error are demonstrated. See e.g., Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT
12, PI8; Walter v. Stewart. 2003 UT App 86, P33, cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003);
State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6 (Utah 1993) ("Absent exceptional circumstances,
this court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.") "This rule is
based, in part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider." Ellis v. Swensen,
2000 UT 101, P30.
In this case, Big Sky has not argued plain error, nor has it made any attempt to
demonstrate that "exceptional circumstances" caused its failure to oppose Fireman's
Fund's Motion. Instead, Big Sky attempts to justify its failure to oppose Fireman's
Fund's Motion by arguing that the trial court had "already made its position clear" when
it ruled on Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Appellant's Memorandum
in Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 14.) In fact, Big
Sky goes so far as to argue that, based on the trial court's decision on Lawyer's Title's
Motion for Summary Judgment, it chose not to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion for
reasons of "judicial economy." (SeeicL, atp. 13.) As demonstrated below, Big Sky's
12

justification for failing to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion is both illogical and
disingenuous.
First, Fireman's Fund and Lawyer's Title are two separate entities whose
rights to summary judgment were determined separately and independently from one
another. Fireman's Fund and Lawyer's Title moved for summary judgment at different
times and in different motions. While the issues raised in Lawyer's Title's and Fireman's
Fund's motions involved similar issues, the trial court found that Fireman's Fund was
entitled to summary judgment in its own right. Moreover, the facts underlying Fireman's
Fund's Motion, particularly those concerning the disclosure of the Fireman's Fund policy,
are entirely distinct from the facts underlying Lawyer's Title's Motion. Simply put,
Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment was a separate motion which Big Sky
had a duty to oppose. When Big Sky chose to do nothing, the trial court considered the
motion uncontested and, after finding it to be meritorious, granted the same.
Second, Big Sky's attempt to bootstrap arguments raised in opposing Lawyer's
Title's Motion in an effort to demonstrate that it preserved issues on appeal reveals
profound inconsistencies. On the one hand, Big Sky suggests that it did not respond to
Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment "because the trial court had already
made its position clear" when it granted Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend. (Appellant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 14.) However, at
the same time, Big Sky challenges the applicability of the trial court's decision to deny
13

Big Sky's Motion to Amend with respect to Fireman's Fund, arguing that the trial court
did not make "specific factual findings of untimeliness, unjustifiable delay, or prejudice
as to Fireman's Fund." (Appellant's Brief, p. 26.) Big Sky cannot have it both ways.
If Big Sky truly believed that the trial court's decision denying Big Sky's
Motion to Amend was improper or inapplicable as to Fireman's Fund, Big Sky had an
obligation to raise these arguments in response to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Big Sky however chose to forego presenting these arguments to the trial court,
and instead presents these arguments for the first time on appeal.
Third, the trial court made it clear at the hearing on Lawyer's Title's Motion
that its ruling did not dispose of Big Sky's claims against Fireman's Fund. After ruling
on Lawyer's Title's Motion, the trial court took the opportunity to say a few words
regarding Fireman's Fund. The trial court stated:
THE COURT: All right. Now, I just wanna address Fireman's
Fund. Yes, you were bandied around in the pleadings from both
sides, but you're not before me on anything, Mr. Belnap, so you'll
have to wait until the dust sorts and see what - - how this impacts
your client's position. But you and Mr. Durbano get to live to
fight another day. Okay?
(R. 720, p. 25-26.) (Emphasis added.) The above-excerpt from the hearing on Lawyer's
Title's Motion for Summary Judgment shows that, despite Big Sky's insinuation to the
contrary, the trial court in no way disposed of Big Sky's claims against Fireman's Fund
when it ruled on Lawyer's Title's Motion. Rather, it shows that, with respect to
Fireman's Fund, there were still issues left open and to be determined. Fireman's Fund's
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filed its Motion for Summary Judgment so that those issues could be determined. Big
Sky had an opportunity and duty to respond and oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion, but
decided instead to do nothing.
Fourth, Big Sky's justification for failing to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion
for Summary Judgment, if accepted, would create poor judicial precedent. In an effort to
rationalize its failure to respond to Fireman's Fund's Motion, Big Sky argues:
any response . .. would have been like the remaining Sioux Indians
at Wounded Knee mounting another excuse for additional slaughter
a few days after the first massacre. The relevant arguments had
already been briefed and decided previously, and Fireman's Fund's
Motion for Summary Judgment was merely a formality leading to
the inevitable dismissal. . . . After the trial court's decision with
respect to Lawyers Title, any response to Fireman's Fund would
have been futile.
(Memorandum in Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition, p.
14.)
As set forth above, the trial court expressly advised the parties that Fireman's
Fund and Big Sky would have the issues between them heard on the merits at a later date.
(R. 720, p. 25-26.) That date arrived when Fireman's Fund filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment. Big Sky had an opportunity to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion, but failed to
do so. This decision by Big Sky was shortsighted, as Big Sky was required to oppose
Fireman's Fund's Motion in order to preserve any issues for appeal. In Busch Corp. v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
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For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must clearly
show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot merely assume that
it was properly raised. The burden is on the parties to make certain
that the record they compile will adequately preserve their
arguments for review in the event of an appeal.
Here, Big Sky did not preserve any issues for appeal with respect to Fireman's
Fund. The record is devoid of any pleading or argument made by Big Sky to the trial
court in opposing Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment. Nevertheless, Big
Sky would ask this Court to find that its failure to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion be of
no consequence, and that the Court rely on inferences and assumptions in finding that it
preserved issues for appeal against Fireman's Fund. As demonstrated above, Utah law
does not share Big Sky's relaxed view of a party's duty to preserve issues for appeal.
Big Sky has the burden of showing that the issues raised on appeal were timely
presented to the trial court. Big Sky's decision not to oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion
for Summary Judgment and preserve issues for appeal was not, as Big Sky suggests, a
"mere technicality." (Memorandum in Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for
Summary Disposition, p. 15.) Rather, it was a substantial miscalculation that precludes
Big Sky from pursuing this appeal against Fireman's Fund.2

2

Big Sky's suggestion that it did not oppose Fireman's Fund's Motion due to
concerns for "judicial economy" is nothing more than a post hoc rationalization that in no
way excuses its failure to preserve issues for appeal. (Appellant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 13.)
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IL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT BIG SKY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ASSERTED A
SINGLE CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE
AGAINST FIREMAN'S FUND.
Big Sky argues on appeal that the trial court erred in determining that its
Amended Complaint alleged only a single claim for fraudulent nondisclosure against
Fireman's Fund. Again, this issue was not raised by Big Sky when Fireman's Fund
moved for summary judgment. Nonetheless, Big Sky argues that the trial court erred
when, in determining Lawyer's Title's Motion for Summary Judgment, it gave no regard
to other language or "reasonable inferences therefrom," which Big Sky claims sufficiently
sets forth additional causes of action. (Appellant's Brief, p. 33.)
Out of the seven (7) separately identified causes of action set forth in its
Amended Complaint, Big Sky's Sixth Cause of Action is the only cause of action directed
at Fireman's Fund. (R. 174-82.) Big Sky's Sixth Cause of Action alleges the following:
44. Defendant Lawyers Title and Fireman's Fund knew that
Defendant Fireman's Fund's agent, Defendant TitlePac, had
issued a professional liability insurance policy to Defendant Avis
and Archibald that was in force at the time of Plaintiff s claim.
45. Defendants Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund, and TitlePac have
fraudulently attempted to conceal from Plaintiff that a professional
liability insurance policy exists for Defendant Avis and Archibald
to cover Plaintiffs claim, which fraud has damaged Plaintiff in an
amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial.
46. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under any and all policies
of insurance issued by Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and
TitlePac, and that these parties are contractually liable for their
insurance liabilities.
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(R. 180-81.)3 The trial court determined that Big Sky's Sixth Cause of Action against
Fireman's Fund was one for fraudulent nondisclosure. On appeal, however, Big Sky
argues that in addition to fraudulent nondisclosure, its Amended Complaint can be read to
include other "[p]ossible causes of action," including "vicarious liability for inter alia,
Avis and Archibald's negligence, including common law and statutory causes of action."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 33.)
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief,. . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Importantly, Rule
8 also provides that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct."
UtahR. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).
In this case, Big Sky's argument that the trial court erred by not inferring
numerous additional causes of action into its singular, "Sixth Cause of Action," is clearly
without merit. While Rule 8 requires that a party be "simple" and "concise," it also
requires that a party be "direct" in its pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). Nothing in
Big Sky's Amended Complaint is "direct" in alleging any cause of action other than

3

Big Sky also argues that additional causes of action can be inferred from its
prayer for relief, which states: "Fireman's . . . is liable for damages incurred by their
insured and that they committed fraud upon Plaintiff in relation to the denial of Plaintiff s
claim for damages in relation to the escrowed funds and the unwillingness to produce a
policy or policy number for such insurance." (Appellant's Brief, p. 33) (citing R. 17484.)
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fraudulent nondisclosure. Simply put, Big Sky's Amended Complaint cannot be fairly
read to allege any cause of action other than fraudulent nondisclosure.
In its brief, Big Sky quotes from Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453 (Utah
1955), stating that "a complaint is required only to ' * * * give the opposing party fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type
of litigation involved.'" (Appellant's Brief, p. 32.) While Fireman's Fund does not
disagree that this is a correct statement of the law, Fireman's Fund does not agree that Big
Sky's Amended Complaint satisfies this most basic requirement. To read Big Sky's
Amended Complaint as alleging anything other than a claim for fraudulent nondisclosure
would require not only a healthy imagination, but also a fair amount of creativity.
Clearly, the trial court cannot be faulted for reading Big Sky's Amended Complaint in
accordance with its plain language.
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING BIG SKY'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND.
It is well understood that a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend a
complaint will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Neztsosie v.
Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994) ("We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a
motion to amend a complaint absent a clear abuse of discretion."); Stratford v. Morgan.
689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984) (indicating that the decision to allow leave to amend is
discretionary with the trial court.) Furthermore, the general rule concerning abuse of
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discretion is that the reviewing court will presume that the discretion of the trial court was
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary. See Goddard v.
Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984).
While not exhaustive, Utah courts have typically focused on the following
three factors when deciding whether to grant a motion to amend: (1) the timeliness of the
motion; (2) the justification given by the movant for the delay; and (3) the resulting
prejudice to the responding party. See Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert 784 P.2d
1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds by 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992).
In this case, it was the trial court's consideration of these factors that caused it to deny
Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend.4
During the hearing on Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend, the trial court
noted that nothing prevented Big Sky from asserting its claims "against the insurance
companies from the get-go." (R. 720, p. 23.) The trial court further noted that it was only
after Avis and Archibald went out of business that Big Sky turned its attention to the
insurance companies. With respect to the passage of time and the statute of limitations,
the trial court stated, "it would be prejudicial and unfair to the defendants to have to
defend on a claim that could have come right out of the chute, and now they would be
faced with something that would be time barred by the statute of limitations. That's about

4

Lawyer's Title filed a memorandum opposing Big Sky's Motion for Leave to
Amend, and Fireman's Fund formally joined in the same. (R. 384; R. 411, respectively.)
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as prejudicial as I think that you can get." (R. 720, p. 24.)5
In its brief, Big Sky suggests that the trial court denied its Motion for Leave to
Amend simply because it believed that such a motion was an inappropriate response to a
motion for summary judgment. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 23.) This is not true. While
the trial court did question the propriety of Big Sky responding to a motion for summary
judgment by seeking leave to amend, the trial court nevertheless gave due consideration
to Big Sky's Motion. The trial court considered Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend,
but rightly decided, based on considerations of timeliness, justification and prejudice, to
deny the Motion.
The acts giving rise to this lawsuit occurred over eight years ago. Almost four
years ago, the trial court granted Big Sky's first Motion for Leave to Amend so that it
could assert claims against Lawyer's Title and Fireman's Fund. Almost a year later, and
after Lawyer's Title had moved for summary judgment, Big Sky again sought leave to
amend. Clearly, under the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Big Sky's Motion. See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Company, 854 P.2d 1025
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (upholding the trial court's denial of plaintiff s motion to amend

5

In Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc.. 2004 UT App 44, P38, this Court
explained that another basis for a trial court to deny a motion to amend is "unreasonable
neglect in terms of pleading preparation." While not stated in those exact words, this
appears to have been part of the reason the trial court denied Big Sky's Motion to Amend.
The trial court indicated that Big Sky could have asserted the claims it was seeking to add
via its Second Amended Complaint from the beginning and that there was no reason
justifying its failure to do so. (See R. 720, pp. 23-24.)
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based on concerns that "this is a three year old case, it is an eight year old injury, and . . .
if [res ipso loquitur] were to be pled [it] could well have been pled before in terms of
amendment.")
A. Utah law does not allow a party to amend
a complaint to add a legally insufficient or
futile claim.
Big Sky goes to great lengths to argue that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying its Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. While it is clear
that the trial court's decision was correct and in no way constituted an abuse of discretion,
there is yet another reason why the trial court's decision to deny Big Sky's Motion was
correct - "[a] party may not amend a complaint to add a claim that is legally insufficient
or futile." See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expedition Co.. 2003 UT 57, P33.
In its (Proposed) Second Amended Complaint, Big Sky outlines its additional
claim for "insurer liability," alleging that the insurance company defendants breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not indemnifying it as a "third party
beneficiary" to the insurance contract. Big Sky's (Proposed) Second Amended Complaint
states:
61. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary to Defendants obligations
to insure, protect, defend and indemnify Avis and Archibald, which
third party benefits have not been received by Plaintiff.
62. Defendants acts as alleged above and failure to insure, protect,
defend and indemnify Plaintiff, as a third party beneficiary violate
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings [sic] requiring
an award of punitive or exemplary damages.
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(Underline original.)
Under Utah law, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is limited to first
parties to an insurance contract, and as such, only a first party can sue for breach of that
duty. See Sperrv v. Sperrv. 990 P.2d 381. 383 (Utah 1999.) See also Ammerman v.
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 430 P.2d 576, 577-78 (Utah 1967) (explaining that the duty of good
faith is owed to first parties to an insurance contract, not third-party beneficiaries). This
case does not involve a first-party relationship. Instead, this case involves a third-party
relationship, to which Utah appellate courts have refused to extend the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
In Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 809 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), the plaintiff argued that an insurance company which insurers a tortfeasor under a
liability policy has an obligation to deal fairly and in good faith with an injured third-party
who has a claim against the insurance company's insured. IdL at 748. In rejecting this
argument, the court found that there must be a relevant contractual relationship between
the parties in order for the plaintiff to pursue such a claim. See icL at 749. The court
explained:
In sum, we are persuaded that there is no duty of good faith and fair
dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a third-party claimant,
such as [the plaintiff], seeking to recover against the company's
insured. This conclusion is consistent with the commentators and
the great majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have been
confronted with the issue. As one well-known commentator on
insurance law noted, cthe duty to exercise due care or good faith is
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owed to the insured and not to a third party.5 14 G. Couch, Couch
on Insurance § 51:136 (rev. 2d ed. 1982).
The majority of courts faced with the potential existence of a duty
of good faith and fair dealing running from an insurance company
to a third-party claimant seeking to recover against the company's
insured have rejected such a notion.
Id. at 749-50.
The court in Pixton concluded that the insurance company did not owe the
plaintiff a duty to deal fairly and in good faith in her capacity as a third-party claimant.
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs claim for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law.
A similar result was reached in Savage v. Educator's Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d 862
(Utah 1995). In that case, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the plaintiff, a third-party
claimant, could not bring a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
because there was no privity of contract between the claimant and the insurer. The court
stated, "[bjecause [the plaintiff] has no contractual relationship with [the insurer], she has
no cause of action against it for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
Id at 866. The court also noted that this conclusion was consistent with the great
majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have confronted the issue. See id.
Under Pixton and its progeny, it is well-settled that only a first party may sue
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Sperrv v. Sperrv. 990 P.2d
at 383 (stating "Utah law clearly limits the duty of good faith to first parties to insurance
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contracts").
In this case, Big Sky claims that it is a third-party beneficiary under the
Fireman's Fund policy and that Fireman's Fund somehow breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by not settling its claim. (Appellant's Brief, p. 33.) Big Sky,
however, is not an insured. Big Sky is simply a third-party claimant seeking to recover
damages against one of Fireman's Fund's insureds. Under Utah law, Big Sky cannot
maintain an action against Fireman's Fund for breach of the implied covenant. Because
there is no relevant contractual relationship between Big Sky and Fireman's Fund, Big
Sky cannot make a claim against Fireman's Fund for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. See Pixton, 809 P.2d at 749.
Because Big Sky's "insurer liability" claim is not allowed as a matter of law,
and because the other claims set forth in Big Sky's Second Amended Complaint are not
directed at Fireman's Fund (i.e., "vicarious liability and statutory strict liability"), the
issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend is
entirely moot.6 Simply put, with respect to Fireman's Fund, the outcome of this case was
not affected by the trial court's decision to deny Big Sky's Motion for Leave to Amend.

6

In its brief, Big Sky attempts to argue that its "insurer liability" claim
encompasses more than just a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Big Sky asserts that, while never pled against Fireman's Fund, it is entitled to
relief under Utah statutory law, as well as common-law negligence. These claims have
heretofore never been asserted against Fireman's Fund and, as discussed previously, were
not raised by Big Sky as part of any opposition to Fireman's Fund's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
respectfully requests that the Court affirm the judgment of the trial court, and award it the
costs it has incurred in defending this appeal.
DATED this c A ^ a v of December, 2005.
STRON0 & HANNI

Paul M. Belnap
Andrew D. Wright
Attorneys for Defendant
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
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